Further Expansion of the Japanese Prime Minister’s Power

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Students of comparative political institutions have identified key variables which strengthen the power of the prime minister in parliamentary systems, most notably the electoral system, the prime minister’s formal-legal authority, and the cohesion of majority parties (e.g., Cox 1987, Kam 2009, Lupia 2003, Strom 2000, 2003). These studies significantly contribute to enhancing our understanding of the nature of the prime minister and, more broadly, of parliamentary systems.

Building on this literature, recent research on the power of the prime minister in the context of Japan’s changing parliamentary system has advanced significantly. Several scholars, for example, have explored the expanding policymaking influence of the prime minister and supporting executive institutions in relation to other political actors within the national policy process (e.g., Estevez-Abe 2006, George Mulgan 2017, Takenaka 2019). Most view the phenomenon largely as the result of three broad, institutional developments: 1) the 1994 introduction of first-past-the-post and PR rules to the lower house electoral system, which helped weaken the influence of interest groups in elections and centralize power in the prime minister-as-LDP-president by expanding their endorsement authority over LDP politicians; 2) the administrative reforms of 2001 to expand the legal authority of the prime minister and supporting institutions; and 3) the civil service reforms of 2014 that increased the prime minister’s authority over bureaucratic appointments.

Moreover, scholars have examined the recent expansion of the prime minister's influence over patronage, backbenchers, bureaucracy, and interest groups (George Mulgan 2017, Takenaka 2019, Uchiyama 2010). However, several crucial issues necessitate further examination regarding how the prime minister extends power over other actors and institutions.
Firstly, while it is widely acknowledged that the prime minister has significant discretion in ministerial appointments, there remains uncertainty about how the prime minister uses his power to choose ministers for critical policy delegation. Secondly, questions persist regarding the prime minister's relationship with backbenchers, considering that reliance on dissolving the Lower House or withdrawing endorsement may not always be feasible. Thus, exploration of alternative means for the prime minister to exert influence over backbenchers is necessary. Lastly, the COVID-19 crisis has underscored the prime minister's limited control over policies governed by local governments (Machidori 2020, Takenaka 2020), raising the question of whether efforts have been made to expand power in this realm.

Takenaka’s paper illustrates that after the 2001 reform the Japanese prime minister prefers delegating crucial policies to ministers with special assignments than ministers leading departments. He explains why the prime minister makes such strategic choices despite the prime minister's newfound ability to exert stronger control over department ministers before the reform. The prime minister makes such a delegation as the bureaucracy which special ministers have to rely on is under direct command of the prime minister.

Park examines rational for the prime minister, also the LDP president, to establish numerous committees which directly report to him within the LDP. Her analysis demonstrates that the prime minister creates these committees to increase his control over policy formulation within the LDP, minimizing resistance from backbenchers.

Finally, Kidera's research reveals that the prime minister now relies on the allocation of government financial resources to local governments to exert more influence over them. By scrutinizing the central government budget, he shows that recent prime ministers have created new budgets with fewer strict criteria, allowing greater flexibility in allocating funds to local governments compared to traditional local allocation taxes.

Sub Unit

• Related Groups / Japan Political Studies Group

Individual Presentations

• Why Does the Japanese Prime Minister Favor Ministers with Special Assignments? - Harukata Takenaka, GRIPS(National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

• How Does the Japanese Prime Minister Lead Policy Formation within the LDP? - Jisun PARK, Okayama University

• Projection of the Japanese Prime Minister’s Power over Local Governments - Hajime Kidera

• Japan’s Proactive and Independent Nuclear Safety Regulator - Florentine Koppenborg, Technical University of Munich

Chair

• Christina Davis Harvard University

Discussants

• Phillip Y. Lipscy University of Toronto

• Trevor Incerti University of Amsterdam