Sovereign Debt Dynamics: Regime Survival, Accountability, and Negotiations

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This panel delves into the intricate dynamics of sovereign debt, exploring the overarching theme of government debt accumulation and default behavior across various regime types. By examining the complexities of debt accumulation, sovereign default resolution, and the selection of default targets, the panel collectively contributes to a nuanced understanding of how regime structures impact sovereign debt outcomes and, in turn, how sovereign debt affects regime survival. The papers in this panel address fundamental questions, such as how the debt of a previous regime influences the choices of the current regime, how citizens hold their government accountable for economic policies, the impact of China as a financial lender on a government’s decision to default, the influence of election cycles on economic policy, and the strategies for negotiating with a diverse set of creditors.

Sub Unit

• Division 16: International Political Economy

Individual Presentations

• Credit Ratings, Information Transparency, and Political Survival - B. Peter Rosendorff, New York University; Cameron Ballard-Rosa, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Layna Mosley, Princeton University; Hannah Loeffler, Technical University Munich

• Electoral Cycle and Sovereign Borrowing: Evidence from Africa - Mengfan Cheng, New York University

• Comparing Comparability: Participation in HIPC Debt Relief - Lauren Elizabeth Ferry, University of Mississippi

• The Political Economy of China’s International Debt - Stephen B. Kaplan, George Washington University

• Odious Debt and Support for Sovereign Debt Repayment - Matthew R. DiGiuseppe, Leiden University; Patrick E. Shea, University of Glasgow

Chair

• Layna Mosley Princeton University

Discussants

• Monica Widmann University of California, Los Angeles

• Stephen Craig Nelson Northwestern University