Incumbents and Veto Players in the Politics of Climate Change

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Scholars of climate change often cite incumbents and veto players as reasons for inaction or delay in reducing emissions and adapting to extreme weather. Some view these actors as motivated by the potential costs of decarbonization. In rich industrialized democracies, incumbent firms, workers, and communities rooted in the agricultural, energy, and transport sectors frequently campaign against climate policy, using their considerable resources to do so. Yet why powerful actors attempt to block such transitions in some cases but not others remains unclear. Incumbent firms can alternatively use their structural and instrumental power to secure compensation or mobilize their greater access to capital, diversify business strategies and retain market share. Incumbent governments could replace revenue from high-carbon industries with revenue from low-carbon industries, support the creation of new sources of value in emerging renewable energy industries through industrial policy investments, or substitute high-carbon interests out of their support coalition. Theoretical explanations relating to commitment problems and incomplete information have been advanced, but evaluating the application of these theories in the context of the climate transition requires understanding the relationship between the political incentives and economic capabilities that powerful actors have to reduce carbon pollution and adapt to climate impacts. When do incumbent governments find it politically advantageous to pursue climate policy? When do affected interest groups support compensation and/or empowerment schemes? Spanning rich and poor countries, the papers on this panel address such questions.

Sub Unit

• Division 11: Comparative Politics

Discussant

• Oksan Bayulgen University of Connecticut

Individual Presentations

• Electoral Cycles in Climate Policy and National Renewable Energy Mixes - Todd A. Eisenstadt, American University; Le Bao, City University of Hong Kong; Jennifer Lopez, American University; Cindy Ragab, American University

• The Benefits of Short-Termism? Political Incentives for Renewable Energy - Johnathan James Guy, University of California, Berkeley

• Who’s Really in Charge? Incumbents, Ministers, and the Energy Transition - William Kakenmaster, University of Notre Dame