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Evolution of International Regime Complexes: Adaptation and Maladaptation

Thu, September 5, 2:00 to 3:30pm, Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, 406

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Just as the study of international cooperation would be incomplete focusing on one institution when others are also active in its issue area, our understanding of changes in cooperation over the long term would be incomplete without analyzing the evolution of regime complexes.

This panel brings together scholars to examine the evolution of international regime complexes -- how and why such complexes persist or change over substantial periods of time and with what consequences. We define a regime complex simply as a cluster of international institutions operating in a common issue area and the mechanisms that coordinate them.

Scholars have investigated the evolution of complexes almost since the concept of the regime complex was introduced (Raustiala and Victor 2004). But the specification of the causal mechanisms that drive changes in interinstitutional relations within complexes and shape the contours of complexes’ architectures over time has been less common. Regime complex evolution and the dynamics closely intertwined with it deserve greater attention. Collectively, the papers in this panel provide alternative theoretical approaches to studying the evolution of complexes in order to suggest potentially productive pathways for the research program on regime complexity and global governance.

These alternative approaches include regime complexity theory, delegation theory, historical institutionalism, organizational ecology, and evolutionary theory. Although these approaches are partially overlapping, the dialog among them is still in its infancy. We anticipate that matching and combining these approaches will advance research toward a more complete understanding of how and why complexes evolve.

Contributors are interested in particular whether changes in complexes better adapt them to serve their principals or achieve common substantive goals, such as financial stabilization, economic development or trade liberalization. We refer to change that is successful in these respects as "adaptation," and its obverse as "maladaptation." Candidate explanations include, but are not limited to, the architecture of the complex, as defined by hierarchy and differentiation; the quality of information generated by the complex; the nature of delegation and agency within the complex; and path dependency and reactive sequences. We seek ultimately to advance the research program to better understand the effects of complex evolution on substantive outcomes of cooperation.

Each paper identifies the sources and mechanisms of change as exogenous or endogenous. Exogenous sources involve alteration in the primary origins of the architecture of the complex, such as the preferences and influence of principals (state and nonstate actors) and characteristics of the issue area (such as the height of barriers to entry). Endogenous sources involve changes to the primary origins or the architecture directly that result from complexes' operations, be they substantive outcomes or the institutional strategies of dissatisfied actors.

Our papers assess complex evolution among specific dimensions for comparability. These dimensions include interinstitutional hierarchy and differentiation, but other dimensions as well, such as collaboration among institutions, institutional density, and legitimacy and accountability.

The relationship between domestic regime type and changes in domestic governance, on the one hand, and the evolution of regime complexes, on the other, is addressed by a subset of our papers. The panel engages questions of democracies' international collaboration and the impact of power transition on the liberal, multilateral quality of such collaboration in so doing.

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