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Bureaucracy in International Relations III: Bureaucratic Capacity

Sat, September 7, 10:00 to 11:30am, Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, 308

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This is the third panel of a three-panel series on bureaucratic politics in international relations. The papers in this panel investigate the consequences of bureaucratic capacity for policy outcomes, across a range of bureaucratic contexts and issue areas. Arias and Bare show that social ties among diplomats at the United Nations constitute a form of bureaucratic capacity which enables diplomats to better achieve their diplomatic objectives. Malis and Thrall examine bureaucratic capacity as a function of career trajectories of U.S. Foreign Service Officers, and show that bilateral embassies with greater capacity are more effective in concluding bilateral agreements. Ahmed and Bunte consider how bureaucracies can compensate for one another’s capacity limitations, focusing on the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s response to short-term ambassadorial vacancies. Balcazar and Lee demonstrate the political consequences of bureaucratic inefficiencies, in the context of delays in the delivery of Trade Adjustment Assistance. Altogether, these papers highlight the importance of understanding foreign policy outcomes as a product of not only the policy choices that national leaders make, but also the capacity of foreign policy bureaucracies to implement those decisions.

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