Enforcement, Redistribution and Stateness

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This panel seeks to explore the links between redistributive policies, enforcement of state regulations and “stateness” (understood broadly as the ability of the state to ensure conditions for compliance). Preferences for redistribution in developing regions do not behave as classic political economy theories predict. Support for redistribution is not necessarily shaped by self-interested motivations based on income; the poor are not more supportive of redistributive policies than the non-poor, and the rich are not always opposed to redistribution. Some studies argue that individual preferences for redistribution are directly linked to trust in public services and overall state effectiveness. Others propose that corruption and clientelism reduce demands for universal social policy. These frameworks predict that support for redistribution declines when individuals perceive that the state is not capable or willing to redistribute. Similarly, the political economy literature on enforcement argues that enforcement, and thus compliance with regulations, varies with state capacity and political motivations. If state actors are not willing or able to monitor and punish violations of the law, demand for redistribution may decline, as may demand for enforcement and levels of accountability. State action may also induce low compliance if the costs of complying are perceived to be high. This may be the case if taxes and other regulations are perceived to be high or stringent, administrative processes seen as complex or basic public goods (such as distance from school) not easily accessed. What role, for instance, do differences in access to basic goods and services (such as electricity, health or education) play in shaping demand for redistribution, enforcement or broader patterns of accountability? What trade-offs, if any, do individuals face when forming preferences over redistribution, taxes and enforcement? Does the ability of the state to ensure conditions for compliance matter for support for stricter enforcement or broader patterns of accountability?

Sub Unit

• Division 12: Comparative Politics of Developing Countries

Chair

• Alisha Caroline Holland Harvard University

Discussants

• Victoria Paniagua London School of Economics

• Ana Lorena De La O Torres Yale University

Individual Presentations

• The Structure of Preferences for Conditional Cash Transfers - Florencia Antia, Universidad de la República; Santiago López-Cariboni, Universidad de la República; Irene Menendez, IE University; Cecilia Rossel, Universidad Católica del Uruguay

• Experimental Evidence on Tax Preferences in Highly Unequal States - Cassilde Schwartz, Royal Holloway University of London; Néstor Castañeda, University College London; David Doyle, University of Oxford

• How Incumbent Mayors Affect Democratic Governance: Incumbency, Education, and Kinship Ties in Municipal Councils - Tugba Bozcaga, King's College London; Rabia Kutlu Karasu, Stanford University; Aytuğ Şaşmaz, Bryn Mawr College

• Deferred Compliance and Protection against Informality during Crisis - Sarah Andrea Berens, University of Bremen; Luciana Cantera Rosso, dECON_FCS_udelar; Santiago López-Cariboni, Universidad de la República; Irene Menendez, IE University; Armin von Schiller, German Institute of Development and Sustainability -IDOS

• Selection or Incentives? Examining Bias in Argentina's Corruption Investigations - German Feierherd, Universidad de San Andrés; Guadalupe Tuñón, Princeton University