Elite Politics in Africa (Panel II)

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

This is the second of two sister panels focusing on political elites (e.g., ministers, MPs, and chiefs) in Africa. Wojtanik shows that personal ties to the leader reduce elite defection under autocracies. Ricart-Huguet finds that human capital and competence are important to understand cabinet formation even in a country such as Uganda, the politics of which are often reduced to ethnic considerations. Meda models the loyalty-competence trade-off that presidents face when appointing ministers. Handley reexamines the notions of power and elites to counter the one-dimensional view of the continent’s elites as uniquely self-serving and corrupt. Finally, Lewis shows that elite power-sharing arrangements in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic have led to regime resilience but impeded economic development.

Sub Unit

• Division 53: African Politics

Individual Presentations

• How Shared Identities Shape Elite Defection under Autocracy - Andrew Wojtanik, University of California - Berkeley

• Competence amidst Instability: Cabinet Formation in Uganda since Independence - Joan Ricart-Huguet, Loyola University Maryland

• Autocratic Rule and Economic Performance: The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off - Francis William TOUOLA MEDA, New York University

• Elite Africa: Changing Conceptions of Power - Antoinette Handley, University of Toronto

• Elite Bargains, Democratic Resilience and Economic Change in Nigeria - Peter M. Lewis, Johns Hopkins University

Chair

• Rachel Beatty Riedl Cornell University

Discussants

• Rachel Sigman University of Denver

• Nic Cheeseman University of Birmingham