Propaganda, Censorship, and Self-Censorship in Putin’s Russia

Session Submission Type: Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Propaganda, Censorship, and Self-censorship in Putin’s Russia

This panel brings together diverse research examining state-controlled mass media manipulation strategies as well self-censorship patterns in present-day Russia.
The papers featured in this session delve into the complexities of belief affirmation in mass-media, context-dependent radical rhetoric, disinformation framing, mass-media coverage on the dictator, and the self-censorship of Telegram users.

Paper 1: Propaganda for the Public: How the Kremlin Maintains Mass Support Through Belief Affirmation

This paper argues that in autocracies with substantial public support, such as Russia, rulers do not need to win over or intimidate large groups of citizens; rather, their primary need is to maintain the support and trust of those already on their side and to keep this public invested in the regime. Propaganda can solve this problem via identity-congruent reporting that invokes positive feelings and trust in the state’s narratives among existing regime supporters, a model of media coverage that I call “affirmation propaganda.”

Paper 2: Confuse and Alienate: Authoritarian Propaganda in a High-Choice Media Environment

This paper seeks to understand how Putin's authoritarian regime used social media to shape public perceptions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The authors identify two major framings used by online state media and regime-controlled social media groups to shape perceptions of the war. First, the regime relies on disinformation framing – a set of rhetorical strategies aimed at confusing the citizens and undermining the credibility of alternative sources. Second, the regime relies on depoliticisation framing – a set of rhetorical strategies used to portray the war as a natural and inevitable process which is not possible to resist and comprehend for ordinary citizens rather than a political issue which should be a subject to public deliberation.

Paper 3: Vladimir Putin on Channel One, 2000–2022

Drawing on transcripts from the television network Channel One, a popular news source in Russia, this article addresses the question, “How was Vladimir Putin covered by state-controlled media while the regime became increasingly centralized?” It uncovers three main tendencies. First, during all the years in power, the ruler has been more frequently referred to through positive stories. Second, there is only partial evidence that the relative references to Putin on Channel One have significantly increased over time. Third, during all his years in power, Putin has been more frequently mentioned in domestic news rather than in stories about foreign affairs. However, I also demonstrate that the share of news about foreign affairs and events abroad that mentions the ruler has been increasing every year since 2013.

Paper 4: Context-Dependent Radical Right Rhetoric in Domestic Russian Propaganda

This paper argues that although for social conservative issues such as homophobia, the regime is consistently radical right across both foreign and domestic contexts, the picture is different for ethnic nationalist issues. Even as its ethnic nationalist rhetoric increased dramatically for Western European and North American contexts, it remained stagnant and low for Russian contexts. Instead, domestic propaganda continues to be notably moderate on ethnic nationalism when discussing Russia, either trying to avoid topics such as immigration or adopting less extreme rhetoric.The paper uses evidence from transcripts of propaganda talk shows.

Paper 5: Delete this! Self-Censorship in Russian Telegram

This study turns to Telegram in Russia to systematically identify instances of post deletions, which serve as clear markers of self-censorship. The analysis further extends to various channel-level factors, such as ideological orientation, audience size, competition for audience attention, and network surroundings, assessing their influence on the magnitude of self-censorship in a channel.

Sub Unit

• Division 38: Political Communication

Individual Presentations

• How the Kremlin Maintains Mass Support through Belief Affirmation - Anton Shirikov, University of Kansas

• Authoritarian Propaganda in a High-Choice Media Environment - Maxim Alyukov, University of Manchester; Maria Kunilovskaya, University of Saarland; Andrei Semenov, Nazarbayev University

• Vladimir Putin on Channel One, 2000–2022 - Lanabi la Lova, LSE

• Context-Dependent Radical Right Rhetoric in Domestic Russian Propaganda - Andrey Davydov, McGill University

• Delete This! Self-Censorship in Russian Telegram - Daniil Romanov, Oxford University; Grigorii Kiriukhov, HSE; Artemi Artivua; Evgeny Sedashov, Higher School of Economics

Chair

• Tomila Lankina London School of Economics and Political Science

Discussants

• Bryn Rosenfeld Cornell University

• Nikita Khokhlov Dublin City University