Smoke and Mirrors: Denials, Norm Challenges, and Contested Noncompliance

• In Event: IO Institutional Design

Abstract

Governments that violate international law routinely deny or justify their behavior to reduce backlash. Under what circumstances can these claims mitigate the political costs of noncompliance? We argue that violations trigger linked fights over the underlying facts and the egregiousness of the transgression. Governments minimize backlash by contesting information or challenging norms, while international organizations (IOs) may counteract these efforts and build support for punishment. We test our argument with survey experiments examining reactions to military aggression and human rights abuses by a foreign government. We show that government denials and norm chal- lenges reduce calls for punishment among the US public and Western diplomatic elites. IO interventions successfully counteract denials, but are ineffective at rebutting norm challenges. We also find that non-Western elites are generally resistant to rhetorical messaging. Our findings shed light on the strategic incentives of violating governments and highlight challenges for IOs as they respond to noncompliance.

Authors

• Julia C. Morse, University of California, Santa Barbara

• Tyler Pratt, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill