Justice from Above? Elevated Trials and Intergovernmental Delegation in China

• In Event: Chinese Politics Mini-Conference: Consolidating State Power

Abstract

Given the judiciary’s position within the political system, Chinese local courts are unlikely to side with citizens in administrative litigation. Would transferring these cases to higher-level courts make a difference? Drawing from over 130,000 original court records, we offer the first empirical tests evaluating the effect of "elevated trials" (提级管辖), a reform introduced by Beijing in 2015 to shift the handling of administrative cases against county governments from primary to intermediate people's courts. Our results, using the two-stage Heckman selection model to correct the selection bias, indicate that elevated trials might have placed citizens seeking to resolve disputes with local governments at an even greater disadvantage. We also find that such a disadvantage is jointly correlated with the number of counties involved in administrative litigation and the number of cases undergoing elevated trials, as citizens are, in fact, more likely to win their cases when more counties in a prefecture are entangled within administrative litigation, and when the prefecture faces more cases against county governments. We posit that the adverse impact of elevated trials against Chinese citizens is determined by prefectural leaders' challenge in monitoring county governments to ensure social stability, while also allowing county officials to chase economic growth, which has become a major source of administrative litigation. Our analysis offers deeper insights into the implications of judicial decision-making in China.

Authors

• Chao-yo Cheng, Birkbeck, University of London

• Haibo He, Tsinghua University

• Chao Ma, University of International Business and Economics