The Consequences of Military Control in Medieval China

• In Event: Chinese Politics Mini-Conference: Consolidating State Power

Abstract

Post-conflict state-building remains a challenging endeavor across space and time. This paper unpacks one critical aspect of this challenge: the proliferation of armed groups as an aftermath of civil war. As rulers confront the daunting task of reconstructing political order after war, what are the consequences of their efforts? Relatedly, how do local elites respond when the national government attempts to bolster state capacity? Our research develops a theory of post-conflict state-building by drawing on insights from the civil-military relations literature. We argue that military (re)centralization may increase rulers’ control over the upper echelon of military elites in the regions, but could simultaneously weaken their hold over lower-level officers and soldiers. The state’s coercive capacity declines as the rulers’ efforts at military control exacerbates the divide between the upper and lower military in the localities.

Empirically, we study a later part of China’s Tang Dynasty (618 - 907 CE). As a result of a severe civil war in the mid-8th century, military power became dispersed across semi-autonomous generals who ruled over provinces with large, locally-raised armies in the Chinese hinterland. To reassert imperial authority over the provinces, the regime enacted a military reform aimed at improving centralized control of armies through counterbalancing – i.e. fragmenting the authority of military generals over their armies. From a comprehensive collection of archival and archaeological sources, we digitize and geocode datasets on the career histories and family background of more than 1,400 provincial generals.

Exploiting the provinces’ differential exposure to the reform and using a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy, we arrive at three main findings. (1) The reform accomplished its chief objective by strengthening the regime’s monopoly over violence as control over provincial generals improved over time. This enhancement manifested itself in a decrease in the generals’ rebellions against the regime. (2) Meanwhile, the regime’s coercive capacity, as measured by the ability to enforce order both within the military and with respect to the local society, declined as a result of the reform. Specifically, the reform led to a rise in soldier-led mutinies against their generals, and an increase in both the incidence and intensity of civilian uprisings against the regime. (3) The decline in coercive capacity is further supported by DD estimates at the battle level, demonstrating that provincial militaries became less likely to win battles after the reform.

Authors

• Erik H Wang, New York University

• Joy Chen, Renmin University of China