Aid and the Unraveling of Civil Society in Guinea and Sierra Leone

• In Event: Learning from Global Democratic Challenges and Innovations Mini-Conference III: Democracy in Francophone Africa: Enduring Challenges and Paths Forward

Abstract

The exhilarating third wave of democratization in the 1990s made it seem like democracy had triumphed the world over. However, since 2006, the high tide of democracy was slowly beginning to erode, and at a much faster pace in recent years. Democratic backsliding is global, even in West Africa, the region that made the most democratic gains in the 1990s and 2000s. “Coup culture” and unconstitutional changes to power have once again become pervasive (see, for example, Council on Foreign Relations 2021; Sampson 2012; Mustapha 2012), despite significant international investment in civil society and the active role civil society played in peacebuilding and democratic transition in many West African countries.

While democratic consolidation cannot be reduced to a single factor (Diamond 2022), a strong civil society was viewed as a way to institutionalize democratic norms and serve as a buffer against backsliding. A “free and lively civil society”, effective electoral and representative institutions, rule of law, a functional state bureaucracy, and a market economy were viewed as the pillars of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996). Consequently, following a series of civil wars from 1989-2003, international organizations encouraged the formation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in West Africa to rebuild civil society as part of the peacebuilding process, to promote democracy, and to counterbalance the state.

Drawing on the Tocquevillian idea that voluntary associations without political objectives form the cornerstone of democratic civil life (de Tocqueville, 1835/1994), Putnam et al (1993) argued that associations produced horizontal networks of trust generating civic engagement. Subsequently, Putnam’s neo-Tocquevillian vision of civil society influenced the democratization wave of the 1990s. International organizations imagined a West African civil society comprised of formal organizations (WACSI, 2015) and separate from politics (LeVan, 2011), as central to democratization and development. Participatory approaches became a cornerstone of international development and peacebuilding (Sampson, 2012) and inclusion of civil society was viewed as the way to address emerging global threats (United Nations, 2004).

While Western technical assistance reportedly was more prevalent in successful transitions and more limited, or absent, in failed transitions (Stoner et al 2013), external aid to civil society in West Africa has increasingly been questioned from a theoretical perspective as well as from a policy perspective. However, could (and should) civil society in West Africa be apolitical? While various scholars have debated the apolitical vision of civil society in West Africa (see, for example, LeVan 2011), in this book, I examine two main variables: politicization and professionalization, and discuss to what extent the professionalization and politicization of civil society influence a community’s capacity to collectively respond to crisis, drawing broader implications for democratic consolidation in West Africa. In addition, to what extent do donor preferences, especially with regards to professionalism, or technical capacity, shape civil society, and what does this mean for democracy? This book aims to consolidate these debates within a context where there is increasing skepticism among West Africans as to whether democracy has achieved its promises. Challenges to Western-funded civil society in Africa, for example, the lack of local finance and state-civil society relations, not been examined systematically over time and across countries.

Overall, this book traces the emergence and evolution of formal civil society organizations from democratic transition in Guinea and Sierra Leone, to public health crises (Ebola and COVID-19), and challenges to democracy at present. I examine the presence and density of non-profits as indicative of civic capacity across four field sites (capital cities and large towns in the interior) in Sierra Leone and Guinea, two countries with a prior experience of conflict and similar levels of human development, sharing a long border, with different institutional legacies.

I argue that it is not just the number of associations, or having diverse nonprofits, that leads to resilience – in addition, the quality of deliberation and participation within organization and between organizations, and the diversity of organizations within civil society, matter for resilience. Considerations of the mechanisms fostering civic engagement, such as deliberation over issues, and community meeting attendance, are important in creating the type of civil society that can mobilize collectively during a crisis. A vibrant civil society brings all groups together – formal civil society organizations, informal groups, social movements unions, religious groups, and business leaders –together, across class, ethnic, and religious divides, during times of crisis.

Author

• Michelle Reddy, University of California Berkeley