My Enemy’s Friend: Alliances, Great Power Rivalry, and Deterrence Failure

• In Event: Great Power Competition

Abstract

Despite its significance, there has been limited examination to date regarding the deter-
rence effect of asymmetric alliances involving a minor power and a major power within
the dynamics of great power rivalries. From a realist perspective, relative increases in
its rivals’ or rival camps’ military capability, or decreases in its own, would cause se-
curity concerns for great powers. When a rival forges an alliance with other countries,
regardless of their status as great powers, it triggers significant security apprehensions
for another great power. I argue that, when its control over the system reduces, a great
power is inclined to pose threats, including low-level militarized disputes (MIDs) or
economic sanctions, against the allies or protégés of its rival to address those secu-
rity concerns but not to escalate the threats into great power wars. A great power
challenger’s strategy to threaten its rival’s allies or protégés could effectively weaken
rival alliance camps as it increases rivals’ allies or protégés’ political and economic
cost of participating in alliances. I test this claim using a series of regressions with
great powers’ initiation of low-level MIDs and economic sanctions from post-WW2
era to 2010s. The results support the theory that a country allied with great powers is
susceptible to attack from their patrons’ great power rivals those without great power
allies when they lose some control over the system. Therefore, the deterrence effect of
alliances is limited when they are formed with great powers.

Author

• Chamseul Yu, Texas A&M University