“Elected” Dictators and the Initiation of Militarized Disputes

• In Event: Political Leadership and Conflict

Abstract

Are dictatorships that hold elections less likely to militarily challenge their adversaries when compared to those that do not hold elections? “Electoral dictatorships” develop democratic institutions for a variety of reasons such as to provide the illusion of legitimacy at home and abroad. This is despite the fact practices like elections can result in political instability by providing a voice to regime opponents at the elite level. Further, because such opposition is allowed, a more politically aware and engaged public may emerge to present challenges from below. Given that leaders of these governments arguably have more threats to their rule than those in more closed political systems, the influence of these dynamics on foreign policy and use of force presents an interesting puzzle. On the one hand, serious diplomatic rows with other countries may be more likely to be resolved peacefully because regime leaders do not want to engage in unpopular conflicts that galvanize the opposition. On the other hand, an aggressive foreign policy may signal to political elites and the public that the leadership will stand firm against the nation’s opponents and defend its interests, creating a beneficial “rally effect.” This paper argues that the former is more likely to be the case. Using a novel dataset that codes for “intended” challenges based on MID case narratives, the research finds electoral dictatorships are more cautious in opting to use force when compared to other authoritarian types. However, when evaluating a dispute “intensity” index based on militarized actions taken during a dispute, preliminary findings suggest electoral regimes engage in more violence when they do decide to use force. This paper contributes to the ongoing exploration in international relations of how authoritarian regimes make foreign policy decisions, specifically, those that adopt democratic institutions.

Author

• Richie A Romero, Arizona State University