The Autonomy-Loyalty Dilemma of Junior Allies: The Case of South Korea

• In Event: Middle Powers, Competition, and Conflict

Abstract

Historically, U.S. allies have relied on the security-autonomy trade-off model (i.e., acquire security protection by tightly aligning with a great power patron at the cost of autonomy). However, as the junior allies get richer and gain more diplomatic capabilities, they aspire to pursue strategies that increase their strategic autonomy. Then, does this suggest the end of alliances? Despite the frequent usage of “autonomy” and “loyalty” in alliance politics, these concepts are understudied. Shedding light on the role of competing identities, this paper introduces a new theoretical framework for understanding junior allies’ behavior in asymmetrical alliances. I argue both strategic autonomy and loyalty to the alliance are the key values and interests that many junior allies wish to preserve as middle powers and long-standing allies of the US. Yet, at times, these two don’t align together and create autonomy-loyalty dilemmas and tensions in their foreign policy decisions. To investigate this theoretical prediction, I explore the case of South Korea (ROK). To that end, I employ text analysis to analyze diplomatic documents, congressional reports, civil-service exams for ROK diplomats, and the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)’ annual budget and conduct interviews with foreign policy elites, military officers, and government officials. This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the role of autonomy and loyalty in IR and alliance politics and provide policy implications for Washington’s productive engagement with its allies and strategic partners.

Author

• Kyuri Park, College of William and Mary