Unequal Land, Unequal Politics: Elite Persistence in India

• In Event: New Directions in the Study of Inequality and Democratic Representation

Abstract

Why do high levels of political inequality persist in economically unequal societies? Why are elections in highly unequal societies often dominated by parties and candidates that belong to elite groups, or represent elite interests? Conventional models of political economy predict that higher inequality should be associated with higher levels of support for redistribution and higher support for left-wing parties. When these models have failed to explain actual voting outcomes in unequal societies, the focus in the literature has typically been on demand-side factors such as ethnic, social and cultural cleavages.

Building on the theoretical foundation laid by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and Manza (2021), I argue that supply-side factors may be just as important, particularly in new democracies with high levels of poverty. I suggest that unequal societies may limit the supply of parties and candidates which represent non-elite groups. Elites in societies with higher economic inequality have greater incentive to preserve existing structures. These incentives can manifest themselves in the financing of electoral campaigns, expensive patron-client systems and even forms of violence and disenfranchisement against non-elites. Such elite initiatives increase the costs of participation for non-elites, hence entrenching elite domination of politics. Moreover, inequality, particularly in impoverished societies, can reduce educational opportunities for members of marginalized groups. This can inhibit the ability of members of these groups to engage in collective action and to be selected as candidates by political parties, especially considering the educational bias in candidate selection (Gulzar and Khan, 2021) (Dal Bo et al, 2021).

I evaluate these predictions by looking at quasi-random differences in colonial land tenure systems in India, building on the work of Banerjee and Iyer (2005). While Banerjee and Iyer (2005) posit that more unequal land tenure systems could have led to more class conflict and calls for redistribution, I posit that the opposite may be true. More unequal systems may actually produce greater elite domination of politics, manifesting in higher vote-share for right-wing parties, lower vote share for subaltern-led parties and lower subaltern representation across parties.

Empirically, I test these predictions using an instrumental variable approach and a geographic regression discontinuity. Firstly, I adopt the instrumental variable used by Banerjee and Iyer (2005), which uses the date of British conquest as an instrument for the colonial land tenure system in a particular district. As a result of ideological changes in Great Britain, any Indian territory which was annexed between 1820 and 1856 received a non-landlord dominated system. The design is built on the identifying assumption that the date of annexation, after controlling for the number of years under British rule, did not have an impact on political outcomes outside of its impact through land tenure systems. Secondly, I test these predictions by using a geographic regression discontinuity (GRD) approach around two regions of India, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, where the borders between colonial land tenure systems do not coincide with modern or historical administrative boundaries.

Across both primary research designs, I find that areas with more unequal land systems were more likely to have higher levels of support for right-wing parties and elite-led parties. They are also associated with more socio-economically privileged candidates. The effect is persistent across time and robust to different conceptions of political parties. I also provide some suggestive evidence for the aforementioned mechanisms, using data on the education and assets of legislators. Finally, I also consider and eventually reject potential alternative explanations for these results, including those centered on socio-cultural factors such as Hindu Nationalism.

The findings suggest, contrary to most theoretical predictions, higher levels of economic inequality are actually associated with higher levels of political inequality and elite domination of politics. The results have significant implications for our understanding of historical political development, political representation, the role of inequality in shaping politics, and the politics of redistribution.

Author

• Abhyudaya Tyagi, Columbia University