Zero-Sum Thinking and Policy Preferences

• In Event: Personality and Politics

Abstract

Across a variety of policies, when people believe a group they are a member of is in competition with another group, they are less likely to support policies that help the other group and more likely to support policies that hurt the other group. In a "zero-sum game", the opposing side doing poorly is equivalent to one's own side doing well. Therefore, individuals who perceive they are competing against other groups in a zero-sum game sometimes endorse policies which hurt their own group because they believe such policies hurt another group more. This results in some individuals endorsing policies which hurt all groups. For example, members of the Tea Party wanted cuts to healthcare programs they benefited from, because they felt other groups benefited more. Where do preferences for policies which hurt both the in-group and out-group come from?

To date, work investigating this phenomenon in public opinion has primarily focused on what causes a belief that one's own group is competing against a specific out-group over a specific limited material or symbolic resource. However, recent work in psychology has suggested "zero-sum thinking" as a general world view that shapes beliefs about social relations.

In this paper I apply the idea of "zero-sum thinking" to understand how people form policy preferences. Using a nationally representative survey of over 2,000 respondents I first measure belief that group interests are inherently incompatible in general (i.e. measuring beliefs about group relationships without specifying which groups are involved). I demonstrate that this general measure of zero-sum thinking correlates with beliefs that specific group relationships are zero-sum. People higher in the generalized zero-sum thinking measure are more likely to report that the economy, international trade agreements, and race relations are zero-sum competitions.

I next use a survey of over 900 respondents to test whether this measure of generalized zero-sum thinking predicts preferences for resource distribution. Across five tested policy areas (taxation, international relations, workplace benefits, affirmative action, housing) I found that people higher in generalized zero-sum thinking were more likely to view policies as zero-sum tools for allocating fixed resources. For example, people higher in general zero-sum thinking were more likely to report that government assistance to minorities hurts White people or that building new housing hurts existing residents in that area. These patterns were true regardless of party. While Democrats and Republicans differed in the extent to which they saw policies in zero-sum terms, generalized zero-sum thinking predicted viewing policies as zero-sum for members of both parties.

Finally, I use a survey experiment to manipulate generalized zero-sum thinking and test if this increases the extent to which respondents view specific policies as zero-sum. This work shows how beliefs about seemingly disparate policies are influenced by underlying beliefs about how the world works.

Author

• Alexander Tolkin, University of Pennsylvania