Regulatory Agencies and Partisanship: The Consumer Product Safety Commission

• In Event: Balancing Acts: The Supreme Court and Interbranch Politics

Abstract

The legal and political landscape for independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in the United States is evolving. As federal courts cast doubt on the bedrock legal underpinnings of regulatory decision-making, and the backdrop of rising political polarization, debates about the roles of executive control and legislative influence on IRAs continue. We explore the dynamics of nominations and confirmations on the likelihood of partisan splits in rule-making decisions using an original dataset of Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) votes (N = 2075) from 1997--2023. The CPSC is constrained by partisan balancing requirements, and its subject matter is not generally as contentious as other IRAs. We hypothesize that dissent is costly, and so the presence of increased partisan splits would be notable. Our results suggest that this is not the case, however, lending support to the notion that the institutional construction of IRAs can insulate such decision-making from the overall political dynamics of the day. These findings have implications for the durability of regulatory institutions within a democratic system.

Authors

• Patrick John Gauding, University of the South

• Benjamin L. Cavataro, Villanova University