Constraining the Demos Democratically

• In Event: Democracy and Toleration in Early Modern Political Thought

Abstract

Within liberal democracy, a longstanding tension exists between the protection of individual rights and responsiveness to popular preferences. This tension arises from the conflicting demands of substantive and procedural conditions for democratic government (see Dahl 1989, Chapter 12; Cohen 1997; and Estlund 1997). Democracy requires, substantively, that government be constrained in order to protect a sphere of individual rights and, procedurally, that government be demotic in order for policies to respond to popular preferences. Yet, these conditions produce a dilemma: On the one hand, constraining the government lessens responsiveness to popular preferences. On the other hand, leaving the government unconstrained reduces protections for individual rights.

We elucidate this dilemma by reconstructing the historical debate between Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington. Although neither supported democratic government in the contemporary sense of the term, their debate usefully illustrates a range of conceptual possibilities. In Leviathan (1994 [1651]), Hobbes describes a pure democracy in which the demos dominates. When the demos is sovereign, he argues, government must completely obey its will. This option (“popular tyranny”) is wholly demotic but sacrifices individual rights. Meanwhile, in The Commonwealth of Oceana (1992 [1656]), Harrington envisions a republic with aristocratic and democratic elements. To preserve freedom, he maintains, government must distribute power among competing groups. This option (“the mixed constitution”) is duly constrained but undermines popular responsiveness.

We resolve this dilemma by turning to the boundary problem in democratic theory (see Whelan 1983; Bohman 2007, Chapter 1; and Ochoa Espejo 2011, Chapter 2). While Hobbes and Harrington share the unstated premise that there is a single demos with fixed boundaries, we explore the implications of an alternative assumption on which there are multiple, overlapping demoi with variable boundaries. The fact that one demos can reach a decision, but another demos can always revise its decision, constrains the demos, contra Hobbes, without adding an undemocratic element, pace Harrington. In other words, the demos is constrained democratically.

Crucially, this outcome satisfies both substantive and procedural conditions for democracy. Insofar as one demos balances another, the government is constrained, thereby safeguarding individual rights. Likewise, to the extent that demoi check each other, the government remains demotic, consequently upholding popular responsiveness. In this way, a consideration of the boundary problem in contemporary political theory helps to address a well-established concern in the history of political thought.

References

Bohman, James. 2007. Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to Demoi. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cohen, Joshua. 1997. “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy.” In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg, 407-437. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Estlund, David. 1997. “Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority.” In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg, 173-204. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Harrington, James. 1992 [1656]. Harrington: “The Commonwealth of Oceana” and “A System of Politics,” eds. J. G. A. Pocock and Raymond Geuss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1994 [1651]. Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, ed. Edwin Curley. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing.

Ochoa Espejo, Paulina. 2011. The Time of Popular Sovereignty: Process and the Democratic State. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Whelan, Frederick G. 1983. “Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem.” In Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. New York: New York University Press, 13-47.

Authors

• Kristin Zuhone, University of California, Berkeley

• Joseph Warren, University of Alaska Anchorage