Political Economy of Sanctions in Iran’s Resistance Economy

• In Event: Poster Session: Comparative Politics

Abstract

This paper seeks to explain the domestic politics of the Global South countries when they face comprehensive economic sanctions. Considering that sanctions lead to accumulating collective losses in an economy, it is quite puzzling that, in most countries, the status quo is maintained. To solve this puzzle, this paper focuses on Open Economy Politics (OEP) as one of the main approaches in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) and searches for the gains and losses of different groups. By fleshing out the survival mechanisms, it is argued that the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the relative winners normalizes and may even advocate for the worsening circumstances.

Iran is selected as the case to study the politics of interest group interactions due for several reasons. While Iran sanctions are not limited to the history of the Islamic Republic regime , the country has been continuously the target of various sanctions programs in the past five decades. The sanction programs are utterly diverse and range from individual travel bans and asset freezing to an embargo on oil and the central bank of Iran. Significantly, Iran is almost the only country that has experienced a period of partial sanctions relief between two periods marked by heavy sanction programs . This may allow the scholars to somewhat isolate and disentangle sanctions effects. Also, my familiarity with the country’s politics, along with my ability to read and follow original materials in Farsi, improve fieldwork and data collection processes. However, some issues remain unresolved, including personal biases and relevant difficulties in accessing data. To conduct the research, I will carry out a multi-method design. The research will have strong internal credibility in explaining the single case of Iran, through ethnography in the field, process tracing, and interviews with business leaders , political and economic actors, and decision-makers.

The paper tests its hypotheses by using an annual firm-level survey and Tehran’s stock market data. Regarding the increasing popularity of economic sanctions as tools of statecraft, it is aimed that the study will carry broader implications for understanding the limits and consequences of transnational sanctions.

Author

• Niloofar Adnani, Johns Hopkins SAIS