Strategic Spender or Controlled Chief? Measuring Presidents’ Spending Discretion

• In Event: Executive Power and Bureaucratic Politics

Abstract

Congress has the power of the purse, but does the president have power over funds once they are outside the purse? This paper explores the practice of executive spending discretion, that is, the practice of strategically spending a different amount than appropriated by Congress. While forms of this practice such as explicit impoundment have played roles in political crises such as the first impeachment of President Donald Trump, executive spending discretion has not been systematically studied. Examining original data on all federal subunits from 1952 to 2020, I quantify executive spending discretion across presidents, agency structures, and legal changes such as the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and Train v New York (1975). Lastly, I estimate the degree to which presidents apply executive spending discretion differently depending on presidential policy preferences. In other words, despite a set appropriation from Congress, how presidents manipulate the share of appropriated funds spent such that spending is responsive to their policy priorities? By understanding how much executive spending discretion the president holds, I provide insight into an understudied source of power not currently studied in US interbranch negotiation and effectiveness of government reform. Given the central role of the power of the purse in the US Constitution’s system of checks and balances, understanding the president’s spending power is critical to understanding interbranch relations and relative power across branches.

Author

• Kevin J Angell, University of Chicago