When Do Diplomatic Protests Succeed? Political Information and No Rally Effect

• In Event: Poster Session: Public Policy & Society, Extremism, and Democratic Backsliding
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: Society, Extremism, and Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

When a change in another country's security policy conflicts with its national interests, a state lodges a diplomatic protest. Diplomatic protests from neighboring countries can trigger a rally phenomenon, increasing support for the country's leaders and security policies and strengthening the calls for hard-line policies. Also, diplomatic protests from rivals with political disputes with one's own country have a rally effect, while diplomatic protests from quasi-allies have no rally effect. A question, then, is when will diplomatic protests not induce a rally effect and succeed in reducing interstate tensions by reducing support for leaders and security policies within the target country and weakening the desire for hard-line policies? We argue that the greater the public's exposure to political information, the less likely they react emotionally, making diplomatic protests less likely to produce the rally phenomenon. The presidential campaign provides the public with political information through the debates between the incumbent and opposition parties. Therefore, we tested the above hypothesis by conducting online survey experiments during the most recent campaigns for the South Korean and Taiwanese presidents. The results indicate that diplomatic protests from rivals and quasi-allies do not provoke the rally phenomenon. Still, they can reduce support for leaders and policies and weaken hawkish preferences.

Authors

• Koji Kagotani, Chuo University

• Jiyoung Ko, Korea University

• Wen-Chin Wu, Academia Sinica