Cyber War in Ukraine and Strategic Learning

• In Event: Cyber War in Ukraine and Beyond

Abstract

Adaptation and learning are vital to the successful adoption of new military capabilities. Innovative uses of new domains and technologies are often tested and improved upon iteratively in the heat of battle. But strategic-level learning and adaptation also relies upon an interplay between this real-time tactical and technical experimentation and the theoretically-grounded observations of strategic analysis communities far from the battlefront. The accrual of evidence and testing of hypotheses plays a critical, if sometimes undertheorized, role in this process. Today’s information-centric emerging domains and technologies pose particular challenges to this learning process. This is nowhere more apparent than in the dichotomous analyses of cyber domain conflict that have emerged surrounding Russia’s war in Ukraine. While some domain experts have described the cyber dimension of the war as “relentless and destructive,” “strategic and deliberative,” and the “world’s first full-scale cyberwar,” others have referred to it as “the dog that didn’t bark.”

This paper examines the variance in interpretation of the cyber domain’s role in the Ukraine war – and the broader risks and challenges it highlights. Drawing strategically and theoretically relevant conclusions based on observations of an ongoing conflict is never easy. It always faces difficulties due to the early and incomplete nature of the evidence. But the ongoing lack of consensus concerning the extent and role of cyber conflict in the current war indicates a deeper challenge stemming from the domain’s covert nature and resulting information asymmetries. The article examines the implications of these asymmetries for iterative strategically relevant learning concerning the cyber domain’s strategic role in conflict, including: impact on adversary warfighting capabilities, signaling, and escalation dynamics. Considering the broader implications for relevant learning processes surrounding other emerging technologies, I argue that a critical element in determining which states make better use of these new technologies will be their organizational ability to bridge the divide between tactical, operational, and technical skill and innovation, and the strategic level analysis and planning necessary to utilize these capabilities to the maximum coercive or warfighting effect.

Author

• Jaclyn A Kerr, National Defense University