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In this chapter, I ask the question, “How does the capacity of rebel groups influence the governance styles they provide?”. I became curious with how rebel strength influences a group’s choice in governance style as I believed that high rebel strength would naturally lead the group to allocate more resources to governing. Previous research on this topic seemed to confirm by suspicion as rebel governance provides legitimacy in the eyes of civilians and potential recruits while also enabling easier local resource extraction vital to the rebel’s military capacity (Kalyvas, 2006) My conceptualization categorizes rebel governance into four distinct styles which rebel groups choose to implement or not. Rebel groups are first and foremost armed actors with a military objective in mind, but they are also have political goals and governance helps them achieve these goals simultaneously. Which styles they choose to invest in (or not) rebel reveals important information about their objectives, goals, and values. Using data on rebel governance from 1989-2011 I find that weak rebel groups do not implement governance, moderately strong groups use strong governance, but the strongest groups forgo certain types of governance in favor of others. This provides an interesting extension of the literature on rebel capacity and how that shapes their views on governance provision.