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State reactions to “naming and shaming” range from human rights improvements to backlash. One overlooked form of backlash is countercriticism coercion, or the threat or imposition of sanctions on other countries that issue human rights criticism. Given the costs of coercion and the failure of coercion to persuade domestic or foreign audiences of the absence of rights violations, why do states ever escalate from criticism to coercion? I theorize that states with greater economic power and government restrictions on domestic freedom of speech are more likely to react coercively to human rights criticism from abroad. State reactions to Nobel Peace Prizes to human rights activists demonstrate that economic power is a necessary condition for countercriticism coercion. Among economically powerful states, states that restrict freedom of speech at home are more likely to threaten or sanction external critics in response to categories of criticism such as United Nations speeches, parliamentary resolutions, human rights prizes, and tweets. China is a relatively frequent and early user of countercriticism coercion, followed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and recently India. The conditions underlying countercriticism coercion shed light on why states care about external criticism.