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Laws that restrict eligibility for political office to candidates with specific desirable characteristics often impose disproportionate burdens on particular groups, hindering their political participation. This study investigates the consequences of India's unique `two-child limits' for individuals aspiring to local government offices, which create a trade-off for individuals who have not yet reached their ideal family size: a choice between long-term familial security and political aspirations. Leveraging variations in law adoption across Indian states and employing a difference-in-differences approach, I find that fertility limits reduce the candidacy of Muslims, the largest religious minority and one of the most marginalized groups in India. On the other hand, there is no significant impact on the overall candidacy of other groups, although there is the replacement of aspiring young candidates with older candidates for other groups. These findings suggest that the lack of replacement, unlike other communities, may potentially explain the decline in Muslim candidacy. Based on insights from primary data collected through phone surveys of more than 500 village politicians in Maharashtra, I argue that disproportionate consequences are not entirely a preference for larger families among Muslims but also imperfect enforcement. This study underscores the complex nature of the disproportionate trade-offs brought about by ballot access laws under imperfect enforcement and its implications on the political entry of marginalized minority groups.