All Well on the Western Front: The Myth of US Military Decline

• In Event: Declining Powers and International Conflict

Abstract

This article critically reassesses the discourse surrounding the alleged decline in US military effectiveness, a highly debated topic in American public and academic realms. We identify and address a critical conceptual error in existing analyses of US military performance: the conflation of military effectiveness with military success and conflict outcomes, which leads to misconceptions about US military capabilities. Our analysis reveals that the US has not performed worse in interstate wars over time, and has experienced only a marginal reduction in the quality of outcomes in Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs). But contrary to the widespread narrative of decline, we argue that US military effectiveness, when properly defined and assessed, has either improved or remained stable. This slight decline in MIDs success is the result of the US engaging in more and increasingly complex military disputes as it evolved into a global hegemon. In other words, the US has engaged in more MIDs over time, and more difficult ones.

Our approach involves three steps: First, we propose a clear definition of military effectiveness. Second, we evaluate US military effectiveness in every post-1945 war, using the most accepted metrics in the literature. Third, we propose a basic theory of MIDs outcomes and robustly demonstrate that, in statistical models controlling for the difficulty level of MIDs, any sign of decline in US military effectiveness disappears. This study not only corrects conceptual errors in a critical area of military analysis but also has significant implications for US grand strategy, foreign policy, and domestic narratives of national decline.

Authors

• Harrison Greenleaf, University of Notre Dame

• Pedro Accorsi Amaral, University of Notre Dame