Lobbying Influence on Congressional Oversight of Arms Exports

• In Event: Law, Legislating, and US Foreign Policy

Abstract

What explains why certain members of the United States Congress vote in favor of exporting arms during congressional floor voting? This paper examines the circumstances under which a member of Congress votes either for or against a proposed joint resolution that aims to prohibit a presidential arms sale request under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The AECA requires that the president notify Congress of foreign arms sales plans before issuing export licenses. Members from congressional committees with jurisdiction over arms exports, such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, can propose joint resolutions if they do not endorse the plans. If the majority of committee members from both chambers support the proposed joint resolution, it advances to roll-call votes, allowing any member of Congress to decide whether to support or oppose the resolutions. Recent studies suggest that congressional oversight efforts have weakened due to increased polarization in Congress. However, it does not necessarily mean that polarization always makes congressional oversight less likely for arms export policies. Particularly, when joint resolution proposals against president’s arms export plans proceed to the floor voting after committee hearings, it serves as a manifestation of the common agreement among members to oversee the plans. Consequently, polarization is less likely to be the primary factor influencing floor vote choices for non-committee members. Instead, voting outcomes are shaped by the individual political interests of the members. In this paper, I focus on discussing factors that could affect the voting choices of individual members of Congress. I argue that financial contributions to individual members of Congress from defense contractors have a significant influence on their voting decisions, particularly in relation to arms export policies. For the empirical analyses, I collected data of roll-call votes of the joint resolutions on foreign military sales by members of both chambers from the 105th to 115th Congress. I also collected data of the financial contributions (sourced from opensecrets.com) to members from defense contractors, along with details on their locations. These contractors were designated to sell arms to foreign countries by the president’s arms sale proposals. The empirical outcomes reveal that financial contributions from the defense contractors have significant effects on the voting choices of members of Congress. Specifically, if these legislators receive financial contributions from defense companies that are designated to export arms, they are more likely to be supportive of such exports to foreign countries. The influence is notably stronger when the defense companies contributing are located within the legislators’ states (for Senators) and districts (for Representatives). Furthermore, the empirical analyses demonstrate that these financial contributions also impact the influence of the legislators’ partisanship on their voting decisions. When legislators receive financial contributions from defense companies in their own political districts, the likelihood of supporting arms sales increases even if the president proposing the arms sales plan does not share same the partisanship as the legislator. The findings presented in paper contribute to the existing literature, expanding the discussion of congressional oversight of US arms exports to foreign countries. Firstly, the paper underscores the influential role of lobbying, particularly in the form of financial contributions, in shaping congressional voting choices. Secondly, it highlights the substantial impact of constituency on legislators’ decisions, originating from defense contractors within their own districts. Most importantly, contrary to the prevailing understanding in previous studies, the empirical findings of this paper support the notion that congressional oversight efforts are not simply swayed by polarization within Congress. Instead, they reveal that other factors can override partisan effects in roll-call voting, at least in the context of arms sales policy decisions.

Author

• Hoshik Nam, Jacksonville State University