State Control and Information Disclosure of Civic Organizations

• In Event: Evolving Governance Strategies in Policymaking in China

Abstract

How do governments oversee and control civil organizations in China? Using a novel panel dataset of civic organizations, we demonstrate that governments employ a combination of indirect and direct political control to oversee and monitor these entities. Specifically, information disclosure by civic organizations decreases as the distance to overseeing governments increases. In cases where governments exhibit weak political control, civic organizations tend to disclose less information. Conversely, strong political control prompts these organizations to disclose more information.

Additionally, governments are warier regarding international donations compared to domestic contributions, necessitating civic organizations to provide more comprehensive information on international funding. Moreover, in regions with weak indirect political control, governments resort to direct control over civic organizations. Civic organizations are more likely to become government-affiliated foundations when the distance from overseeing governments is substantial.

Author

• Wenhui Yang, University of Texas at Austin