Delivery of Geographically Targeted Goods: To Swing or Core Voters?

• In Event: Group Appeals

Abstract

Scholars of distributive politics have suggested that ruling parties have incentives to deliver targeted goods or pork, that benefit specific voter groups within particular geographical areas. However, existing research presents mixed evidence regarding whether ruling parties predominantly focus on delivering goods to their core constituents or to voters in swing districts. This paper seeks to investigate how ruling parties strategically allocate geographically targeted goods both before and after elections, and whether their focus is on core or swing voters. Nevertheless, not all swing voters (or core voters) receive targeted goods to the same extent.

Relying on the case of Korea, which has seen prevalent pork-barrel politics in recent years, a country that has experienced widespread pork-barrel politics, this study aims to explore why certain swing voters (or core voters) receive more targeted goods compared to others. The argument put forth is that the spatial clustering of voters plays a crucial role, transcending the simple categorization of core or swing voters. I argue that ruling parties tend to distribute more targeted goods to areas where swing voters are highly clustered.

To examine this argument, the paper utilizes fine-grained data on the most popular geographically targeted goods in Korea, surveillance cameras and free street wifi installed in recent years, combining with data of precinct level election results to overcome the limitations associated with commonly used measures of geographically targeted goods, such as bills or earmarks, which often pose challenges in distinguishing beneficiaries between core and swing voters.

Author

• Eun Young Kim, The College of William & Mary