Capture, Political Selection and Local Governance: Evidence from Benin

• In Event: Political Economy of Elite Decision-Making in Africa

Abstract

How do local executives respond to elite capture of accountability institutions? To answer this question, I study two alternative decisions local executives can make when facing elite-instigated no-confidence votes: sharing spoils among councilors to buy their support or improving status quo governance and development outcomes to please voters. I argue that sharing spoils with councilors can undermine governance outcomes and accelerate removal processes if elites can buy off spoil-based support. On the contrary, improving governance quality and development outcomes signal performance to voters, improve popularity, and deter the removal threat if the costs of removing a popular well-performing incumbent outweigh its rewards. Future investigation of the 2016-2017 wave of no-confidence votes on mayors in Benin provides empirical support to the theoretical argument. In 2016-2017, mayors who did not endorse elites’ preferred candidates in the 2016 presidential elections were likely to face no-confidence votes. Comparing these mayors to those who endorsed elites’ preferred candidates, using data from reports of fiscal transfers’ audits to municipalities, I find that the former improved the quality of governance, performed better, and provided more public goods after the wave. I also find that voters discount councilors’ allegations and expect more from local executives. Overall, findings suggest that elite capture of accountability institutions can still improve governance and development if it allows public revelation of costly information to politicians.

Author

• Lazare Kovo, Emory University