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When and under what conditions do liberal democracies enter into security cooperation arrangements on migration (CAMs) with non-democratic states? Recent studies show that democracies strive to control migrants abroad to evade domestic care responsibilities. Funding, joint training, military resources, personnel, and communication in turn increase the state capacity of non-democracies. I argue that shifts to the right in western liberal democracies facilitate collaboration on migration with illiberal partners by prioritizing domestic benefits of CAMs over their international costs. When in government, right-wing parties enact CAMs to fulfill their policy agenda and validate their electoral position. As the opposition, right-wing parties drive left and center governments to coopt and enact CAMs—though at a lower rate—to remain in power. I employ a multimethod approach consisting of a novel data collection effort of CAMs between EU members and their regional partners from 1990-2023 alongside a case study of Denmark’s recent migration policy shifts. My results showcase that (1) right-wing governments are positively and significantly associated to the enactment of CAMs compared other governments, even when controlling for asylum applications and refugee stocks; (2) right-wing governments enact CAMs with non-democratic governments at a higher rate, compared to left or center governments; (3) and governments will coopt CAMs from right-wing parties if they present a threat to the incumbent government. The study contributes to the cooperation and migration literature by analyzing the influence of challenger parties on foreign policy in a polarized landscape. It additionally increases our understanding of how such opposition can affect the cost-benefit analysis of democratic governments when implementing or coopting costly policies.