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In multiparty civil wars, why do some rebels form alliances with each other but some do not; while still others divert resources to inter-rebel conflict? We argue that rebel-constituent ties affect inter-rebel relations, as these ties are shown to have implications for a group’s organizational capabilities as well its bargaining power with domestic and foreign governments. We expect rebels providing services to the public to be more credible partners; whereas groups having destructive relations to be less credible. By employing newly released datasets on rebel behaviors, we find that groups providing services to civilians are better able to overcome commitment problems surrounding beneficial-but-risky alliances among rebels. On the other hand, rebel groups with destructive ties with the public fail to find allies due to credibility deficiencies; instead, their substantial lack of credibility makes them likely candidates for inter-rebel rivalries. Overall, our findings reveal that rebel-constituency ties influence inter-group relations.
Keywords: Conflict, Inter-Rebel relations, Cooperation, Rivalry, Rebel-Constituent ties