Foreign Relations with the EU and Its Impact on Democratic Backsliding

• In Event: Democracy and Foreign Policy

Abstract

With the dissolution of the USSR and a shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world system, we have experienced a period of democratization. One of the offered explanations for this phenomenon was that certain actors in the West (namely the US and EU) were keen on promoting democracy, thus the non-democracies interacting with them had incentives to democratize. It has been argued that increased linkage with the West through economic (international trade), societal (common culture), and organizational (international organizations, treaties) ties would make it more difficult for a country to autocratize, and it would increase the chances of democratization1. Going in line with this argument, one can easily point out to the democratization processes of the newly independent Central & Eastern European countries, in which most of them have quickly managed to reform their old communist system into a Western liberal democracy. This has been caused by the new membership criteria put by EU (Copenhagen Criteria) that required applicants to become a liberal democratic state with respect to individual freedoms and human rights. Hungary and Poland, for example, were very successful in this process, becoming model cases for democratization in the region. Apart from post-communist states, a long time western ally Turkey were showing promising progress since 1990s. Over the course of the last two decades, however, all three countries (Hungary, Poland, and Turkey) experienced significant drops in the quality of their democracies to varying levels. The AKP led by Erdoğan since 2002 in Turkey, Fidesz led by Orban since 2010 in Hungary and PiS led by Kaczynski since 2015 all pursued policies to erode the democratic institutions and norms within their countries.

It is impossible to talk about the democratization and the democratic backsliding periods in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey without discussing their relationship with the EU. Moreover, it is impossible to discuss democratic backsliding in the region without discussing the role EU plays. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to ask the question “How does the foreign policies of Hungary, Poland, and Turkey vis-a-vis the European Union plays a role within the context of democratic backsliding?”. Firstly, one can argue (as several scholars already did) that the Western institutions which previously promoted democracy lost their “fervor”. This allowed leaders to pursue autocratic policies easier. Secondly, it may be argued that the leaders in these countries were able to use the pressure from the EU (which demanded they adhere to democratic norms etc.) to their own benefit and using it to bolster their legitimacy domestically. Lastly, it is also important to discuss the possibility that even if the EU “wants” to prevent democratic backsliding among it’s members and candidates, it just may not be capable of doing it, as many scholars have criticized the EU on this aspect. The paper will focus on the second answer and examine how the authoritarian leadership in the named countries acted in response to crises vis-a-vis the EU and framed the situation domestically. The paper argues that populist leaders were able to frame the crises in a way to boost their support while maintaining their linkage with the EU.

Author

• Oğulcan YILDIRIM, SUNY, University at Albany