A Gift for an Autocrat: Failed Coups

• In Event: State Violence and State Repression

Abstract

Although coups have led to a myriad of human rights violations through time and across different regions, only a handful of studies have examined how different types of coups influence state repression in the aftermath. In this article, I seek to explain how coup types affect state repression and the repression strategies of leaders in the post-coup period. Leaders select repression tools by weighing their costs and benefits, enabling them to swiftly eliminate opposition and advance sensitive policies aligned with their interests, all within the political opportunity structure of the post-coup period.
Successfully overthrowing the former regime and/or leader demonstrates the new leader's strength—high capacity—which enables them to employ the most demobilizing repression methods against regime opponents despite these methods' high costs. The results show that successful coups increase extrajudicial killings and disappearances that have a high capacity for demobilization. In addition, successful regime-change coups increase state repression more than successful reshuffling coups because the regime-change coups eliminate the former regime, while reshuffling coups only change the leadership. On the other hand, failed coups create an opportunity for leaders to repress but their weak position—low capacity—prevents them from implementing the most demobilizing repression methods due to their associated costs. The results show that failed coups increase political imprisonment and torture that have low demobilization capacity. In addition, results show that failed regime change coups increase state repression more than failed reshuffling coups.

Author

• Yusuf Evirgen, Binghamton University