Rethinking Deterrence for the New Era of Great Power Competition

• In Event: Deterrence and Coercion

Abstract

The growing rivalry between the United States, China and Russia will not only be the defining feature of global politics in the coming period, but also seems poised to be much less predictable than the Cold War competition. This paper analyzes the dynamics of strategic stability, restraint, and deterrence in this new context, arguing that the volatile nature of tripartite strategic competition (see e.g. Kilgour and Brams (1997); Twomey (2011)) is compounded by the uniquely aggressive postures of Russia and China, and the vulnerability of their regimes. I show that the seemingly robust Russian and Chinese autocracies face unprecedented internal challenges, which have skewed their strategic behavior in two fundamental ways. First, to defuse elite and social discontent, Moscow and Beijing have grown increasingly reliant on diversionary antagonism and conflict with the West. Second, the aggressive nationalist sentiments, which the Russian and Chinese regimes have stoked to bolster their legitimacy, severely limit their ability to compromise and avoid escalations.

References:

-Kilgour, D. Marc, and Steven J. Brams. “The Truel.” Mathematics Magazine 70,no.5 (1997):315–26.

-Twomey, Christopher P. “Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers.” Asia Policy,no.11 (2011):51–78.

Author

• Aleksandar Matovski, Naval Postgraduate School