Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflicts: Explaining Myanmar’s 1948 Conflict Onset

• In Event: Institutions, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict in Myanmar

Abstract

Ethnic conflict’s onsets are mostly explained by instrumentalists’ view of relative deprivation or constructivists’ view of threatened identity. However, most of the existing theories and explanations of specific conflict assume an intention from part of an actor to engage into a conflict. Applying the international relation’s concept of security dilemma, I argue that ethnic conflict can occur when none of the concerned actors want an armed confrontation. The conflict is, in that case, a spillover effect of factors that cloud the intentions of the actors and prevent bargaining. Using the case of Myanmar’s 1948 conflict onset between the Karen and the Government of Burma, I find that none of the stakeholders made armed confrontation a priority. Rather, by tracing the process that led to the conflict I show that factors internal to the Karen communities and a contested state prevented the leadership of both groups to strike a bargain, ultimately leading to conflict. This finding is important given the widespread assumption that conflicts in Myanmar are primarily driven by the ethnic identity of the actors. With Myanmar currently experiencing a revolution, it is important to move away from the ‘identity trap’ and unearth the many political dynamics that prevent the country to move forward.

Author

• Constant Courtin, University of British Columbia