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Constituent casework is one of the most fundamental aspects of the jobs of members of Congress. Yet, how do members of Congress approach casework when the person on the other end of the request is unlikely to vote for them in future elections? Do members of Congress prioritize responding to people they view as more likely to vote? Do members of Congress and their staff systematically discriminate against their constituents who belong to opposing political parties and are therefore unlikely to belong to any future electoral coalition? Do members of Congress prioritize co-partisans when responding to casework requests? Theories of representation suggest that Congressmembers strategically use the powers of government for their own electoral benefit, discriminating against constituents in opposing political parties and favoring constituents in their own party. Richard Fenno’s Home Style: House Members in Their Districts describes a relationship between members and their district that consists of concentric Constituency Circles, with smaller groups closer to the center having more direct relationships with their legislators due to their increasing likelihood of voting for the member in any future election (1978). Employing an email audit study containing constituent service requests sent to every member of the United States House of Representatives, this study seeks to understand how members of Congress’ responsiveness to their constituents is altered when given electoral and partisan cues. This approach will directly test if Fenno’s theory of concentric Constituency Circles of representation is manifested in how members of Congress think about and approach their jobs. The main independent variable that will change in this study is the partisan and electoral cue given in the subject line which will be the first thing that a member of their staff will see when receiving an email. By manipulating these partisan and electoral cues in the subject lines, we can appreciate how these cues will impact the dependent variable, member’s responsiveness. By examining email opens, open time, responses, response times, and the sentiment of response emails we will be able to understand how these cues may impact how a member of Congress responds to a constituent service request. This study has vital implications, as a hallmark of a well-functioning democracy is that after campaigning ends, governing begins. We will also contribute to a growing literature of audit studies by being one of the first where the subjects are members of the U.S. House of Representatives and also include an original survey of over 1,700 Americans regarding how they think members of Congress approach these questions, and how they interact with Congress using email. Once in office members of Congress should theoretically be responsive to all their constituents equally and put partisanship aside when dealing with service requests from their constituents. This study will uncover if this is true. Do members of Congress see themselves as public servants who must respond to the needs of their constituents, or are they perpetual candidates always looking forward to the next election?