The Use of Anti-terrorism Laws as a Tool of Counterinsurgency, 1945-2022
Fri, September 6, 4:00 to 5:30pm, Pennsylvania Convention Center (PCC), 111BAbstract
Why do some governments use their legal systems as a tool of counterinsurgency – for example, prosecuting armed group members in domestic courts for terrorism-related crimes – while other governments prioritize other counterinsurgency strategies? What impact do these criminal prosecutions of have on the dynamics of armed conflict? Following the September 11th attacks, the UN Security Council urged countries to enact domestic laws criminalizing terrorism, as a means of strengthening the international anti-terrorism legal regime. In response, many countries altered their domestic laws to criminalize a wide range of terrorism-related offenses. This paper explores how and why governments used these new anti-terrorism laws to counter (perceived) threats from armed groups. I argue that governments are more likely to pursue criminal prosecutions for terrorism-related offenses when armed groups draw support from narrow civilian constituencies; this allows governments to portray group members as terrorists and criminals, without losing significant public support. In addition, democratic and partially democratic governments are more likely than non-democratic governments to use law as a tool of counterinsurgency; deploying their legal systems lends legitimacy to counterinsurgency efforts, helping these governments maintain popular support. I examine these arguments quantitatively using an original data set on domestic laws criminalizing a range of terrorism-related offenses, including laws criminalizing terrorist acts, financing, recruitment, membership, and incitement, for all countries worldwide from 1945 to 2022.