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Authoritarian Do-Overs: How Reforms Influence International Legitimacy

Thu, September 5, 10:00 to 11:30am, Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Franklin 11

Abstract

A growing body of research suggests that authoritarian regimes may gain international legitimacy when they undertake reforms. According to recent studies, for example, Saudi Arabia and Jordan promote women’s empowerment in part to signal modernity and Western-friendliness to international audiences, potentially obviating the need to undertake deeper political reform (e.g., Al-Rasheed 2013; Bush 2019; Tripp 2019). To date, however, these hypotheses have not been tested experimentally. This paper helps fill the gap by presenting results from an iterative series of experiments conducted over nationally representative samples of US citizens.

Results consistently suggest that reforms (of a variety of types) do generally enhance legitimacy, yet also provide support for several new and previously undocumented findings: (1) it may be easier for authoritarian regimes to obtain positive “boosts” in legitimacy (such as higher favorability ratings and support for positive actions, e.g. increased trade) than it is for them to “shield” themselves from punitive actions (e.g., boycotts and cutting off relations); (2) inward-facing and prodemocratic reforms, especially liberal initiatives like enhancing women’s rights and autonomy, produce the strongest “boosting” benefits; (3) more outward-facing reforms that stress benefits and contributions to global welfare, such as commitments to scientific advances or reductions in carbon emissions, produce the strongest “shielding” benefits; and (4) authoritarian monarchies undertaking reforms gain fewer “boosting” benefits, compared to military dictatorships, seemingly due to higher baseline levels of support for authoritarian monarchies that may create ceiling effects, while at the same time, authoritarian monarchies demonstrate greater resilience to skeptical responses about their reforms, compared to military dictatorships. Implications for broader theories of reform efforts and legitimacy formulas, including counter-to-type persuasive dynamics and the logic of monarchical exceptionalism, are discussed.

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