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How do political and electoral concerns affect presidential decisions to centralize policymaking? Whether the White House is driving policymaking on a given issue affects the process, content, and probability of passage of federal policymaking on a given issue. Despite the president being first and foremost a political actor, we know little about how political and electoral considerations affect presidential centralization decisions, with prior research focusing on the managerial side of the decision. This paper examines how the political context, such as the public’s priorities, presidential popularity, and election cycles relate to presidential centralization. Based on archival research of over 300 policies randomly selected from the Eisenhower through George W. Bush Administrations, I find that presidents are more likely to centralize easy-to-understand “doorstep” issues when such issues are rated as highly important by the public. The same relationship does not exist for more complex issues. This paper further illuminates how presidential management of the executive branch is shaped by both political and managerial factors.