A Model of State-Crime Relations: Crackdown, Collusion, or Omission?

• In Event: Mini-Conference on Democracy and Organized Crime: Crime-State Symbiosis: New Theories and Evidence

Abstract

Governments have various approaches to dealing with organized crime, ranging from aggressive crackdowns to passive tolerance and even collaboration. To understand the logic behind the varied responses of governments, I develop a formal model that highlights the intertwined interests between the national government, organized crime groups (OCGs), and the community. I propose that the “illicit benefit" that ordinary citizens derive from the presence of OCGs is a key factor in determining the intensity of criminal violence and the government's response. When citizens benefit more from OCGs’ businesses and social services, OCGs are more likely to reduce violence in order to secure citizens' support and increase their chances of survival. This reduction in violence may then perpetuate the collusion between the OCG and the government. I present evidence supporting these main findings from a case study of the Shanghai Green Gang and the Japanese Yakuza.

Author

• Heesun Yoo, Emory University