Aristotle on the Political Limits of Civic-Friendship Education

• In Event: The Education of Citizens and Statesmen

Abstract

While Politics V.9 clearly argues that “education relative to the regime” is greatest with respect to preserving regimes, scholars continue to debate the proper place of political friendship in within Aristotle’s regime-specific education. Skeptics of the robustness of Aristotelian political friendship tend to emphasize that political friendship is a quasi-friendship that is merely “like” friendship. This paper inventories the distinct quasi-friendships that seem relevant to Aristotle’s accounts of regime-specific education and political friendship, especially equitable quasi-friendship and the quasi-friendship of like-mindedness. Equitable friendship, which aims to please and not to pain others in Politics IV.6, is distinct from the like-mindedness said to be like friendship in Politics IX.6; only the latter quasi-friendship is prepared to issue painful sanctions to those who plunder the commons for private gain. A hypothesis is advanced that equitable friendship is appropriate habituation for civic education, while like-mindedness is more appropriate for the political virtue of active citizens. The implication is that Aristotle regards the virtues appropriate to the young, for their education relative to the regime, as different from the virtues appropriate to adult citizens. The paper concludes with tentative further implications for how scholars should read the Politics in light of Aristotle’s developmental view of quasi-friendships appropriate to first aspiring (or young) and then active (or mature) citizens.

Author

• Robert Wyllie, Ashland University