Integrated Deterrence: A Solution in Search of a Problem

• In Event: Military Power and Strategy

Abstract

This paper explores the utility of the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which features prominently in the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Richard Rumelt, a leading scholar of business strategy, writes that the first thing a strategist should do is to identify the core problem at hand. The problem that integrated deterrence is intended to solve, however, is unclear. Instead, we are offered a solution in search of a problem. Is the problem China’s rising power and the threat of an invasion of Taiwan? Is the core problem adversaries’ undesired behaviors in “the gray zone” and a perceived need for more flexible options to deter them? Or is it something else? Senior officials and outside analysts have offered conflicting accounts.

This paper creates a typology of different types of deterrence and assesses the utility of integration to strengthen various forms of deterrence. It finds scant historical evidence that a perceived lack of integration on the part of a deterrer is a significant cause of major conventional deterrence failures. This suggests that the concept offers little to help American strategists with their most pressing challenge: deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Or, for that matter, with deterring other instances of major conventional aggression, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Increased integration will strengthen some types of deterrence (and assurance) more than others. Integrated deterrence is not an essential part of the solution no matter the deterrence problem; indeed, it is largely irrelevant to America’s most important deterrence challenges.

Author

• David Palkki, Air War College