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Despite numerous voices in policy circles and the media raising concerns that climate change is increasing the risk of conflict, the academic literature remains divided over the exact link between water scarcity, extreme weather events, and political violence. Theorists debate the causal mechanisms, and empirical analyses have been inconclusive on whether water scarcity, abundance, and/or deviations increase or decrease conflict risks. While some of these inconsistencies may be explained by issues in aggregation, we contend that the impact of water scarcity on political violence depends on both local economic and demographic resources, which shape the capacity for an area to absorb these climate change shocks, as well as the type of violence under study. More specifically, we predict that low-income, urban environments will be more susceptible to sudden changes in rainfall patterns. In addition, because insurgent operations require more resources than terrorist groups, armed conflicts will be more susceptible to climate change triggers than terrorism or other “low-level” activities. We test these arguments using a unique global dataset of quarterly rainfall, economic development, and population density data which has been geocoded and matched to the PRIO-Grid spatial data structure. We then analyze the effect of these predictors on armed conflict and terrorism events data between 1990 and 2019. We find support for past work suggesting that it is extreme rainfall deviations - not scarcity or abundance - that drive political violence. Furthermore, the risk of political violence is higher in areas that experience lower-than-average rainfalls, but only in regions that are also densely populated.