Political Law Firms as Agents of Influence in Campaigning and Lobbying

• In Event: US Lobbying as Individual and Group-Specific Practice

Abstract

Political scientists have long believed that campaign activity and lobbying activity must be considered together to explain corporate political activity (CPA), and that firms choose how to conduct these activities. Conventional explanations for group activity consider group (firm) type, membership structure, and the presence or absence of a trade association (Kowal 2018). By the mid-1990s, the practice of election or ‘political’ law grew to include campaign finance as another branch of CPA. If law firms manage multiple aspects of a firm’s business, then the particulars of how to participate in campaign finance or how to lobby is not necessarily made by the client but may reflect the advice given by its lawyers. I hypothesize that choice of law firms explains how/why groups select their mix of political activities since political lawyers implement crucial influence strategies – lobbying, hiring, contracting, establishing non-profit organizations and now, electioneering. Nyhan and Montgomery (2015) show that common political consultants explain how campaign tactics are adopted. I use the Advisory Opinion (AO) request process at the Federal Election Commission to uncover important relationships between political law firms, their clients, and government regulation of campaign practices. Using network analysis, I seek to test my hypothesis that political law firms explain the current landscape of influence modalities.

Author

• Robin A. Kolodny, Temple University