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According to standard models of political preferences, individuals’ preferences are expressed as a function of proximity to their ideal point. However, recent experimental research has revealed the normative nature of ideology and policy preference. These studies show that self-reported policy preferences will more closely resemble the modal party preference when exposed the threat of sanction by members of the in-group (political party). We extend this line of research by showing that these same basic dynamics—change in expressed preference in response to threat of social sanction by in-group members—can also increase the acceptability of extreme in-group policies without these policies being directly referenced. We argue that this effect occurs due to the possibility of being seen as associated with or sympathetic to the political out-group. We test our expectations through a pre-registered large-scale (N=3200) novel survey experiment conducted in South Korea and the United States. Building on these experimental results, we use agent-based modelling to understand how both the intra-party and national windows of acceptability evolve over time in response to both elite messaging and social interaction.