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Business in Conflict: The Effects of Smuggling on the Production of Violence

Fri, September 6, 10:00 to 11:30am, Pennsylvania Convention Center (PCC), 113B

Abstract

When looking at the business side of insurgency, irregular warfare, and terrorism, a question that often arises is how armed groups are funded. Most importantly, do the funding sources matter in understanding the political violence they perpetrate? Scholarly work on the financing of Violent Political Organizations (VPOs) emphasized their reliance on civilian taxation, smuggling and trafficking, kidnapping and ransom, diaspora remittances, charity donations, foreign aid, cryptocurrency, among others. Because the type of linkage and interaction between VPOs and smugglers has been little studied, we lack a clear understanding on its role on conflict dynamics. Smuggling happens at any time and yet, in wartime, it is associated with different outcomes in different places. Therefore, I aim to contribute to unpack the crime-terror nexus and understand whether smuggling can directly and systematically generate or mitigate political violence in a conflict, such as transforming it into a high- or low-intensity conflict. I analyze the violence VPOs produce following four trends: strategic repertoire, frequency, target selection, and spatial displacement. This project focuses on the ongoing conflict in the Sahel, specifically on VPOs operating in Mali where violent activity linked to insurgent groups has dramatically increased since the 2011 Tuareg rebellion and created opportunities for latent terrorist groups to seek territorial control. Using a mixed-methods design, including interviews with experts and vulnerable populations, I argue that VPOs engaged in collaborative practices with smugglers would resort to minimal violence targeting civilians. Yet for VPOs resorting to smuggling as a form of good provision for local populations, spirals of violence between them and state forces are expected. Following that logic, VPOs that do not try to control localities through economic ties would be less targeted by state forces despite they resort to the most lethal violence towards civilians.

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