Broken Promises: Why Ex-combatants Fight Again after Peace Agreements

• In Event: Post-conflict Peace and Reconciliation

Abstract

Why do some ex-combatants decide to return to organized violence after having signed a peace agreement with the government, while others inside the same organization do not? I try to answer this question by studying the divergent trajectories of ex-combatants and splinter groups after the Havana peace agreement signed between the FARC rebels (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the Colombian state in 2016. Using within-case analysis and process tracing based on archival work and semi-structured interviews, I show how external factors to the group (e.g., change in government, and slow and partial peace agreement implementation) can exacerbate internal divisions within the armed organization, leading to fracture and splintering in the aftermath of war. This is important because scholarship on civil war assumes that former fighters' remobilization is a necessary step for conflict recurrence, but the mechanisms leading former fighters to re-engage in organized violence are not yet fully understood. This critical dimension represents a gap in our knowledge that my work seeks to address.

My argument is sequential: I postulate that there are external factors to the group that impact its internal dynamics, which in turn influence its post-conflict behavior and peacebuilding outcomes. In my model, external shocks to the group (e.g., a change in government during the implementation phase of the peace agreement) can cause internal fractures, with some members deciding to go back to war and others deciding to honor the agreement. On the contrary, if there is no major external shock affecting the internal dynamics of the group, there will be no internal dissent and higher chances of sustaining the cohesion of the group in the post-conflict. Finally, and more crucially, the splintering or cohesion of armed groups has implications for their behavior and peacebuilding outcomes. If the armed group remains cohesive after the peace agreement, their return to armed struggle is less likely, reducing overall violence levels. If the armed group splinters in the aftermath of the peace agreement, the remobilization of old actors and the appearance of new ones becomes more likely, paving the way for more violence.

My research has important implications for conceptualizing non-state armed actors and thinking about their relations with the state. We usually tend to see armed organizations as unitary and monolithic, acting in cohesive ways. However, my project shows this is a skewed view that hinders our understanding of complex post-conflict processes derived from internal dynamics within armed groups, like the splintering and remobilization of old actors, the emergence of new ones, and the breakdown of relations between armed groups and the state. For instance, out of roughly 70 FARC warring fronts, it is estimated that 20 to 30 remobilized, displaying divergent trajectories. Some fronts returned to fighting as insurgencies, organizing new groups with a stated incompatibility with the state, like the Segunda Marquetalia group, while others, such as the Estado Mayor Central group, reemerged as criminal armed organizations interested in controlling subnational territories and illicit markets.

Therefore, to analyze intra-group variation and tease out patterns of behavior inside the organization, I gather information on the FARC fronts, create a medium-N dataset (N≈70), and use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to test my hypotheses, especially those about factions inside the group. Exact numbers vary, but it is often considered that the FARC had between 66 and 70 fronts during the height of the War (1990-2010). The fronts were its leading military and tactical subdivision, responsible for carrying out military operations and controlling territories. For each front, I collect information on their demobilization or remobilization status, their leadership and level of ideologization, the number of combatants, the type of activities they were devoted to, and their region of operation, among others. I complement this with fieldwork and archival research and interview ex-combatants from different FARC fronts, government officials, scholars, victims, civilians, NGO practitioners, and experts in armed conflict and peacebuilding.

My preliminary findings point to two main reasons for FARC ex-combatants' return to war. First, remobilized commanders accused the government of unilaterally changing the agreement's text and being slow to implement some key points. They grew impatient, skeptical, and believed the government did not hold up their side of the bargain. Second, a change in government during the implementation phase of the agreement led to a breakdown of state-rebel relations. Colombian voters elected right-wing conservative Ivan Duque in 2018, who ran part of his campaign on the promise of revising the peace agreement, while the more extremist wings of his party called for an absolute ban on it.

Author

• Sebastian Tobon Palma, University of Illinois at Chicago