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Governments engaged in armed conflict with insurgent groups often resort to indiscriminate measures in their counterinsurgency campaigns. While existing research identifies numerous predictors of such government actions, the theoretical mechanisms behind these activities remain unclear. This study focuses on the imposition of curfews during Turkey's counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurdish insurgency. It posits that detecting where civilians' loyalties lie provides the government with an opportunity to implement indiscriminate measures at a minimal cost. Using a regression discontinuity design, the study reveals that districts with insurgent-loyalist civilians are more prone to curfew imposition, irrespective of insurgent activities in those areas. Furthermore, implementing curfews selectively in certain districts allows civilians to escape the affected areas, rendering districts with insurgent-loyalists more legible for counterinsurgency efforts. This displacement of civilians alleviates the identification problem, leading counterinsurgents to employ more selective violence. The findings suggest that governments may opt for indiscriminate measures in districts heavily populated by insurgent loyalists who are already alienated, thereby avoiding public backlash in other areas.